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Electoral Competitiveness and
Legislative Productivity
Soren J. Schmidt and Matthew B. Young

Background
On 10 October 2016, the two major-party candidates for U.S. Representative of
Utah's 4th Congressional district held a publicly televised debate. Incumbent Mia
Love represented the Republican Party, and challenger Doug Owens was the Democratic nominee. During that debate, Representative Love made seven references to
legislation she had supported during her last term. When asked what she would do
to make higher education affordable, for example, her response focused on her legislative accomplishments, repeating twice that "I have introduced three bills to do that"
(C-SPAN 2016). Her choice of emphasis reflected her efficient legislative record: In the
previous term (her first), Representative Love secured committee consideration for
72 percent of the bills she introduced in the House (Library of Congress 2016).
Just two days later, another debate was held-this time between the two majorparty candidates for U.S. Senator from Utah. Republican incumbent Mike Lee faced
Misty Snow, the Democratic challenger. Despite having been a member of Congress
for four years longer than Representative Love, Senator Lee only referred to two
pieces of legislation during the debate. When he was asked about how to make higher
education affordable, Senator Lee opted to respond in broader terms, repeating three
times the phrase "government should not be in the business of [making money from
student loans]" without referring to any specific bills (C-SPAN 2016). The difference
in rhetorical strategy also reflected Senator Lee's legislative record: Only 26 percent of
the bills he introduced had reached committee hearing during his first term (Library
of Congress 2016).
What might account for the difference in legislative records and subsequent rhetorical choices? The incumbents had much in common: Both were freshmen in Con119
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gress, represented similar constituencies, belonged to the same party, shared basic
ideological views, and were running election at the same time. There is, however,
one particularly salient disparity-the competitiveness of the candidates' districts.
In 2010, Senator Lee won the general election by a margin of 28.8 percent (New York
Trmes 2010). Representative Love, on the other hand, had edged out her 2014 opponent by only 3.2 percent (New York Times 2014).
Our research indicates that the observed differences between Senator Lee and Representative Love are not isolated incidents but rather a reflection of general patterns in
actual legislative productivity. Legislators in competitive districts are overall much more
effective at moving bills through the legislative process. We combine public election data
with Volden and WISe111an' s measures of legislator effectiveness to create a unique panel
dataset including each member of the House of Representatives, 1976-2014 (2009). We
find that an absence of electoral competition results in a 13 percent drop in overall legislative productivity. This effect is robust across a variety of parameters and applies to
all levels of legislator seniority. Furthermore, the difference appears to be almost entirely
the result of changes in the production of substantive and significant legislation.

Theoretical Framework
Existing scholarship
Several theories comprise the framework for our research. The first is a mainstay
of political science-the electoral connection (Mayhew 1974). If politicians are indeed
single-mindedly focused on reelection, we can understand the reasoning behind their
choices of how to meet that objective by studying the factors that affect their behavior.
Mayhew suggests that advertising, credit claiming, and position taking are the primary methods of achieving the reelection goal (1974). Fermo expands the list of possible goals to also include obtaining legislative power and developing good public
policy (1978). Fermo notes, however, that members of Congress consciously develop
a "home style"-a strategy for dealing with their constituents to gain their trust-that
varies widely by district and elected official (1978). The variations in both constituencies and legislative behavior are essential to our ability to identify relationships
between aspects of each. In this paper, we focus specifically on variation in electoral
competitiveness and legislative productivity.
The study of the effects of congressional electoral competition on various types
of legislator behavior dates back over a half century, beginning with MacRae postulating a causal relationship between competitiveness and representation (1952). The
"marginality hypothesis," as it came to be known, posits that competitive districts
make legislators more responsive to constituents' preferences in an effort to minimize
the risk of losing the next election (Fiorina 1973).
However, recent evidence for the marginality hypothesis has been mixed. Groseclose, modeling elections in which one candidate has a slight valence advantage, found
that the advantaged-and more electorally secure-Gllldidate chooses a more moderate
position than the disadvantaged one (2001). Similarly, Gulati analyzed a decade of U.S.
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Senate roll call votes and ooncluded that senators in oompetitive states are actually less
responsive to the ideological center of their state than are those senators facing little or
no oompetition (2004). One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that elected
officials at risk of losing an election are choosing to "mobilize" their partisan supporters
rather than "moderating" their own positions. This behavior is most understandable in
elections where the strongest challenger is likely to appear in a primary; rather than a
general, election (Harbridge and Malhotra 2011).
There has also been significant positive evidence in favor of the marginality
hypothesis. For example, Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan note that the more legislators vote along party lines, the lower their vote share, which incentivizes responsiveness among marginal legislators (2002). Griffin's research, which employs both
cross-sectional and fixed-effects data of district vote shares and voting patterns across
thirty years, confirmed that members of the House of Representatives facing additional
electoral pressure do tend to be more responsive to constituent preferences in their
roll call votes (2006).
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding marginality, there is relatively
clear documentation of other changes in elected official decision-making due to district competitiveness. Crisp, Kanthak, and Leijonhufvud found that legislators' decisions about which coalitions to form-as measured by bill co-sponsorships-were
affected by electoral competition (2004). In their written communications with constituents, electorally safe legislators claim credit for nonparticularized benefits, while
their marginal counterparts focused on particularized benefits (Yiannakis 1982). Similarly, and more recently, Grimmer' s study of home-style choices noted that marginal
representatives emphasize specific appropriations, while safe legislators build their
strategy around generalized position taking (2013). These findings lend credence to
the broader notion both that legislators alter their behavior in response to the competitiveness of the elections they face and that they consider cultivating an image of
productivity to be an important part of that response.
However, legislators have limited time and resources and must make decisions
about how to allocate them (Butler, Karpowitz, and Pope 2012). Combined, the electoral connection and the pressures of marginality predict that legislators faced with
competition will choose to allocate their time and resources to improve their odds of
reelection. The electoral vulnerability felt by legislators should alter not only their
rhetoric and communication with constituents but also their actual behavior. In
other words, we should observe that legislators in more competitive districts tend to
exhibit behaviors that attempt to maximize their vote share. Here we face a theoretical dilemma-it is unclear exactly which behavior legislators choose to focus on. Two
basic options are available to legislators seeking reelection: legislative production and
constituent service (Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012).
On the one hand, legislators facing tough competition might intensify their
efforts to produce meaningful legislation in order to impress their district. In other
121
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professions, employees facing impending layoffs have an extra incentive to work
hard and demonstrate results to their superiors in order to retain their employment
(Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton 2013). Members of the House of Representative face
potential layoffs-in the form of elections-every two years. If the "job" of legislators
is understood to be the advancement of a particular policy agenda, then it follows
that those who feel most vulnerable to a challenger might put forth additional effort
at proving their competency. There appears to be some evidence for this hypothesis:
Provided that they are members of the majority party, marginal members of Congress
obtain more spending for their districts (Lazarus 2009).
On the other hand, legislative productivity has an opportunity cost. Another
reelection strategy available to legislators is to focus on constituent services (Oliver,
Ha, and Callen 2012). Some evidence supports the claim that legislators believe that
constituent service is generally the more efficient option for obtaining additional
votes in a competitive election (Butler, Karpowitz, and Pope 2012; Carey et al. 2006).
Volden and Wiseman' s brief examination of electoral competition and legislative
productivity found a quadratic relationship between the two, with productivity low
for competitive districts, high for moderately safe districts, and low again for very
safe districts (2014). They posit that "at-risk members might devote their efforts to
activities other than legislative productivity . . . while somewhat safer members focus
their attentions on becoming effective lawmakers. However, members from very safe
electoral districts may feel less pressure to advance legislative agendas."

Our Contribution
The objective of our research is to adjudicate between these competing theories
of resource allocation. We believe that a predominantly rhetorical analysis of "credit
claiming" by elected officials about their lawmaking accomplishments puts the electoral cart before the horse; it necessarily presupposes that the legislators have something for which to claim credit (e.g., Mayhew 1974, Fermo 1978, Grimmer 2013). It is
difficult for a legislator to effectively tout productivity as a justification for reelection
if that legislator was not in fact productive while in office. In contrast, the more legislative goods that a legislator produces, the greater the opportunity to claim credit
and court the favor of the people who ultimately make the electoral difference: political activists, voters, and donors (Stein and Bickers 1994). Consequently, our focus on
legislative productivity seeks to test the fundamental assumptions underlying most
of the previous work on the subject. Additionally, it allows us to generate much more
substantive implications about legislator behavior.
What makes a legislator succeed at lawmaking? The process of lawmaking is a long
and difficult one; legislators must formulate and introduce bills, present and defend
them before committees, build effective coalitions, and ultimately gamer enough votes
to enact the law. Discovering what enables a legislator to succeed at each step of the
process is crucial to our understanding of government functionality, and a great deal of
scholarship has been devoted to its investigation (Volden and Wiseman 2009).
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Crain investigates how state institutional factors can play a role in determining
productivity (1979). For example, he finds states that have longer sessions, meet more
frequently, and have smaller, more professional legislatures, have greater legislative
output. In other words, productivity depends (at least in part) on institutional rules.
However, Miguel and Snyder find that individual-level factors, such as candidate
tenure and personal lawmaking abilities, can lead to greater legislative productivity,
regardless of institutional rules (2006). Similarly, Cox and Terry used new panel data
to find additional empirical support for Mayhew's assertions that seniority, being
a member of the majority party, and leadership positon all boost a legislator's productivity (2008; 1991, 1995). Anzia and Berry even found that legislator sex matters:
congresswomen consistently outperform their male counterparts in legislating (2011).
Building on these studies, we focus on the individual-level factor of district competitiveness while also controlling for institutional variation.
As noted, there is extensive research on the effects of electoral competition on
legislator behavior and the causes of legislative productivity considered separately.
However, only recently have Dropp and Peskowitz and Volden and Wiseman have
attempted to trace connections between the two, and both have indicated the need
for additional study (2012; 2014). The former found that Texas state legislators facing less competition were slightly more likely to author bills but found null effects
on coauthoring, sponsoring, and cosponsoring. However, the constraints of having
cross-sectional data for only one state and the lack of statistical significance limit their
findings to being only "suggestive" and "speculative." The latter study, while utilizing a far richer dataset and more robust methodology, was skeptical of its findings,
noting 1) the possibility of other causal mechanisms at play, 2) previous findings that
were "preliminary and conflicting," and 3) that the combination of their results with
other contradictory ones meant "much more work is needed in this area."
Our approach builds upon this previous work by making methodological alterations that we believe produce more accurate and reliable results. The key differences
in our approach are detailed in the following section. Our study includes the rich
set of legislator productivity data used by Volden and Wiseman but introduces an
improved measure of electoral competitiveness (2009, 2014). This allows us to make
inferences using forty years' worth of information. Additionally, we break down the
measure of productivity to find new results about the specifics of legislators' reactions
to varying levels of competition.

Data and Measurements
Measuring Competitiveness
We employ district presidential vote share to operationalize electoral competition.
The connection between vote share and competitiveness is complex and imperfect, but
it is the closest approximation available (Ferejohn 1977; Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina 1992). In studies of Congress, the district's vote share in the previous congressional
election is typically used (Ferejohn 1977; Bartels 1991; Kuklinski 1977; MacRae 1952).
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However, in our case, using the results of congressional elections when also considering
legislative productivity runs a large risk of endogeneity. For non-freshman legislators,
the previous election's results were likely affected by their behavior in office, including their productivity (Griffin 2006). This is a central flaw of Volden and Wisernan's
analysis, which uses the legislator's own vote share as a measure of competition (2009,
2014). Given that a legislator could gain a higher vote share by being more productive,
this is susceptible to problems of reverse and mutual causality.
Consequently, we opt to use the district vote share of the most recent presidential election to the legislator's session, which is much more likely to be exogenous
to legislative productivity. The main limitation of this measure is that it sacrifices
some proximity to the candidate and election of interest. Principally, it cannot
account for the individual characteristics of the incumbents, challengers, salient
issues, or other unique factors that distinguish the competitiveness of the district's
congressional election from that of the presidential election. Nonetheless, it is
better to accept these limitations than risk simultaneity, and we follow the methods of others who have chosen to do so (Griffin 2006; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and
Stewart 2001; Gulati 2004; Sullivan and Uslaner 1978). Furthermore, we have other
measures-fixed effects and control variables in our models-that we can use to

Figure 1: Competitiveness Validity Check
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account for those differences. Figure 1 displays the relationship between presidential vote share and legislator own-district vote share. Though imperfect, the two
measures are highly correlated, validating our use of presidential vote share as an
exogenous proxy.
The U.S. Census Bureau provided the best data on presidential election vote share
at the district, state, and national level. We collected the presidential election results
beginning in the year 1976, normalized them to a two-party vote share for comparability across time, and then interpolated those party vote shares for midterm years.

Measuring Productivity
The power of Congress is its ability to create and amend laws. Accordingly, we
define legislative effectiveness (or productivity-we use the terms interchangeably)
as the ability of a legislator to advance bills through the legislative process (Volden
and Wiseman 2009). Though simple, this definition is the result of decades of scholarship on measuring the efficacy of legislators and legislatures. Mayhew focused primarily on landmark legislation (1991). Howell et al. find that adding ordinary and
minor enactments to landmark legislation as their own separate groups makes for
a more accurate measurement (2000). Cox and Terry were the first to employ panel
data in a study of legislative productivity, and they summarize the three ways in
which legislative success has typically been measured:
The best-known measures of legislative success are: (1) members' "entrepreneurial activity," as measured by how many bills they sponsor and co-sponsor (e.g.,
Garand and Burke 2006; Wawro 2000); (2) members' "batting averages," defined
as the proportion of the bills they sponsor that are passed (e.g., Matthews 1%0;
Moore and Thomas 1991); and (3) members' "productivity," defined as the number of bills each legislator is able to pass (e.g., Frantzich 1979).
We employ a measure that captures legislator activity in each of those areas and
at every step of the process-the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) developed by
Volden and Wiseman (2009). Using the LES enables us to capture legislator productivity at every step of the process. The LES is calculated based on a legislator's bills that
1) are introduced, 2) receive action in committee, 3) receive action beyond committee,
4) pass the House, 5) become a law. Furthermore, because not all bills require equal
effort or skill to be advanced in the legislative process, their significance is categorized as substantive and significant, substantive, or commemorative/ symbolic, and
each is weighted accordingly. 1 Statistical and graphical summaries of the LES and its
logged measure, LnLES, are provided in Table 1 and Figures 2-3.

Table 1: LES Descriptive Statistics
Variable
LES
LnLES

Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

9,260
9,260

0.998
0.528

1.582
0.505

0
0

18.686
2.980
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Figure 2: LES Histogram
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Central Results
Model 1
In Model 1, we regress the logged LES of each member of the House of Representatives from 1976-2013 on the corresponding presidential election's own-party
vote share in their districts. 2 This simple regression serves as a base to compare the
more complex models and allows us to chart a locally estimated relationship between
district competitiveness and legislative productivity in Figure 4. The trend line shows
that as presidential party vote share increases, legislative productivity falls. This drop
is most precipitous as the observations move beyond the most competitive districts
(those near a 50 percent vote share) to safer electoral conditions (above 70 percent
vote share). Overall, legislative productivity falls by over 40 percent across that range.
In short, it appears that legislators from less competitive districts also tend to be less
productive. Our other models affirm this conclusion.

Figure 4: Lowess Plot
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Models 2 through 5
We employ Models 2 through 5 to test the influence of electoral competitiveness
on legislative productivity across a wide variety of parameters. The results largely
confirm that there is a real relationship between the two variables.
To isolate the effects of district competition, in Models 4, 5, and 6 we include
Volden and Wiseman's control variables for other possible causes of productivity,
such as seniority, party membership, leadership positions, committee memberships,
party majority, ideology, and gender (2009). These controls attempt to encompass
the different personal, institutional, and party influences that could affect productivity (Fermo 1978; Mezey 1978; Wiseman and Wright 2008; Weingast and Marshall
1988; Krehbiel 1993; Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Additionally, we include the
state unemployment rate as a proxy for overall constituency welfare and happiness
(Clark 2003).
To control for intrinsic differences between legislators and across time, we
include fixed effects variables for each legislator in Models 2 and 5. Fixed effects hold
constant characteristics that vary between legislators but remain relatively stable in
individuals over time, such as personality, ambition, expertise, and "innate ability"
(Volden and Wiseman 2009). Using this within-legislator design allows for a more
apples-to-apples comparison by controlling for unmeasurable differences that could
otherwise bias our estimates. However, given that most representatives do not remain
in office for more than a few terms, it is difficult to find enough variation in their district competitiveness and legislative productivity to make any statistically significant
conclusions. It does, however, provide an opportunity to give some confirmation of
the results we see in our other models.
Models 3 and 6 are also fixed-effects regressions but at the level of the state. We
include fixed effects for states and years, which control for unobserved differences
both between each state (e.g., regional culture) and over time (e.g., national mood).
Given the disparities between representatives and districts within each state, this limits somewhat the generalizability of the estimates but produces more variation and
consequently more precise estimates. We use Model 6 to predict the productivity of
legislators at various levels of electoral competition.
Table 2 displays the regression outputs of all our models. Importantly, the negative relationship between district competitiveness and legislative effectiveness persists across all statistically significant results, spanning a wide variety of parameters.
Further, despite the inclusion of a large number of control variables and fixed effects,
the relationship is statistically significant in all but one regression. This consistency
is strong evidence that we have identified a real effect. We believe that the lack of
statistical significance in Model 5 is due largely to the fact that the legislator-specific
fixed effects limit the variation to only a few observations per legislator. Notably, the
coefficient of Model 5 is not statistically significantly different from that of Model 6,
which is the model that we prefer.
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Table 2: Regression Models
Variable
Pres. Party Vote Share

(1)
-0.424***

Logged Legislative Effectiveness Score
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.315*** -0.509*** -0.103*
0.0192

(6)
-0.128**

................................................................... (0.0759) ...... (0.102) ..... JO..-.O.?.~U ...... .<.0. -.0.~3-.3-L ....JO.,.O.~?L . .JO..-.O.~~?L.
OW-NOMINATE
-0.116*** -0.0807
-0.125***
Democrat

(0.0355)
-0.164***

(0.133)
(0.0453)
(Omitted) -0.155***

Female

(0.0310)
0.0382**

(0.0371)
(Omitted) -0.00473

Seniority

(0.0183)
0.0217*** -0.00585

(0.0186)
0.0218***

............................................................................................................................................. J0.00209) .. (0.00834) .....(0.00191) ....
Speaker
-0.215**
-0.0867
-0.210**
Committee chair

(0.105)
0.784***

(0.104)
0.743***

(0.0959)
0.759***

Subcommittee chair

(0.0450)
0.346***

(0.0486)
0.318***

(0.0453)
0.341***

Power committee

(0.0199)
(0.0245)
-0.0596*** -0.0216

(0.0191)
-0.0561***

Budget committee

(0.0155)
-0.0147

(0.0191)
-0.00502

(0.0149)
-0.0136

Majority leader

(0.0169)
0.168***

(0.0192)
0.163***

(0.0158)
0.147***

Minority leader

(0.0453)
-0.0566**

(0.0484)
-0.0630*

(0.0452)
-0.0563**

In majority party

(0.0240)
0.213***

(0.0323)
0.248***

(0.0242)
0.229***

............................................. ............(0.0139)

Constant

.JO.,.O.t~) . ... (0.0135)

....

-0.00282

State Unemployment rate
0.766***

(0.0443)
Legislator fixed effects
No
Year fixed effects
No
State fixed effects
No
9,226
Observations
AdjustedR2
0.00947
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.l

0.192***

0.772***

0.330***

-0.00164
(0.00558) (0.00440)
0.312***
0.0147

(0.0693)
Yes
Yes
No
9,226
0.378

(0.0492)
No
Yes
Yes
9,226
0.0443

(0.0378)
No
No
No
9,165
0.445

(0.0767)
Yes
Yes
No
8,289
0.598

(0.0556)
No
Yes
Yes
8,289
0.478

Model 6

We ultimately prefer Model 6 for various reasons. First, it includes the variables that we believe to be theoretically justified-both the individual-level controls
explored in previous scholarship and the fixed effects we employ to account for varia129
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tion across entities and over time. The choice of states rather than legislators as the
fixed entities retains sufficient variation for precise estimates while still preserving
a large degree of accuracy. Given the large number of external and often unmeasurable factors that can influence a legislator's success in any given election, the model's
goodness-of-fit is impressive. Finally, the other included regression coefficients are all
in the expected direction, further bolstering our confidence in its accuracy.
The most salient features of Model 6's results are the direction and magnitude
of the beta coefficient on the presidential party vote share, our measure of electoral
competitiveness. In contradiction to the findings of both Dropp and Peskowitz and
Volden and Wiseman, our data indicate that electoral competition has a positive, linear relationship with legislative productivity (2012; 2014). Model 6 estimates that, all
else equal, legislators in perfectly uncompetitive districts (100 percent own-party vote
share in the last presidential election) are 13 percent less productive than legislators
in perfectly competitive districts (0 percent own-party vote share in the last presidential election). More realistically, a legislator from a district that voted 68 percent for
her party in the past presidential election (one standard deviation from the mean) is
predicted to produce 3 percent less legislation than a legislator from a district that
only gave 45 percent of the vote (one standard deviation below the mean) to the candidate's party in the last presidential election. As explained in the following section,
while this drop may appear substantively trivial, it masks a much larger change in
production of more important legislation. The central implication of this finding is
that legislators in competitive districts do not seem to sacrifice their legislative activities in order to focus on constituent services. Instead, they appear to intensify their
efforts at advancing their legislative agenda.
The theoretical question we originally posed was whether legislators under
electoral pressure sacrifice their legislative productivity to focus on constituent services or other reelection strategies. Our findings are clear evidence that they do
not. It seems likely that, like employees in other professions, legislators who perceive their seat to be in jeopardy respond by attempting to prove their competency
to their constituents through the production of legislative goods. Our data do not
tell us whether this comes at the expense of constituent services or other supportbuilding activities, and so it is possible (and seems likely to us) that legislators in
competitive districts increase their efforts in a wide variety of ways. What is clear,
though, is that legislators in safe districts are much less productive than their colleagues facing tough competition. In the next section, we explore what that difference in productivity might look like in more concrete terms.

Additional Findings
Our central finding led us to ask two additional questions. First, does electoral
competitiveness affect all measures of legislative productivity equally? And second,
is the effect of competitiveness constant across various levels of legislator seniority?
130
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Subgroups of Legislative Productivity Measures
Having modeled the impact of district competitiveness on the Legislative Effectiveness Score generally, we next employ Model 6 to estimate the competition's
effects on its component parts. This subgroup analysis allows us to tease out heterogeneous effects in our estimates and identify which measures of productivity legislators choose to focus on when facing electoral pressure.
Table 3 shows competitiveness has the greatest effects on production of substantive and significant legislation.3 The table breaks down the Legislative Effectiveness
score into its three component parts. Using the specifications of Model 6, we estimated
the beta coefficients of the presidential party vote share on each individual measure.
Notably, the only type of legislative activity that seems to be affected by competition
is that related to substantive and significant bills. In other words, legislators seem to
respond to the threat of reelection loss by directing their efforts at producing the most
meaningful types of legislation.
Substantive and significant bills allow legislators to claim credit from political
activists and donors in the hopes of not only boosting their image generally but also
raising more money (Stein and Bickers 1994). Interest groups and private entities care
a great deal about substantive and significant legislation, because they often have
large impacts on their industries. For example, the substantive and significant bills
mentioned in the 2010 Congressional Quarterly Almanac involved the extension of
Bush-era tax cuts, doctor's Medicare pay cuts, and oil-drilling regulations, each of
which had far-reaching implications for powerful institutions and organizations (CQ
Almanac 2010). Thus, because receiving and spending more money boosts vote share,
especially for incumbents, legislators might believe that focusing on substantive and
significant legislation will merit larger donations, making for a more secure reelection
(Erikson and Palfrey 2000).
In any case, the results of Table 3 have far-reaching implications. One positive
sign is that legislators seem to respond to electoral pressure as we hope they wouldby producing meaningful legislative goods instead of a slew of private favors or
commemorative bills. However, competitiveness cuts both ways-legislators in safe
districts exhibit drastic drops in their production of substantive and significant legislation. And this response is remarkably powerful; our model estimates that, all else
equal, legislators in perfectly uncompetitive districts produce 32 percent fewer bills
that become law. Even when predicting differences between otherwise equal legislators from districts with vote shares one standard deviation below the mean versus
one standard deviation above it, the model still forecasts that the legislator from the
more competitive district will produce more than 7 percent substantive and significant legislation than his or her counterpart.

Seniority Effects
Our second auxiliary question was whether the effect of electoral competitiveness on legislative productivity varies across levels of seniority-in other words,
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Table 3: Subgroup Analysis
Logged LES component parts
(7)
(8)
(9)
Substantive
Significant
Commemorative

Variable

Pres. Party Vote Share

and Significant

Legislating

Legislating

Legislating
-0.319***

-0.194

0.0686

.........................................................................................................J0.104) ..........................J0.143) ........................... (0.116) ...........
DW-Nominate
-0.130*
-0.01%
-0.249***
Democrat

(0.0737)
-0.111 *

(0.110)
-0.171 *

(0.0766)
-0.128*

Female

(0.0625)
-0.00366

(0.0911)
0.120···

Seniority

(0.0292)
0.0399***

(0.0458)
0.0312***

(0.0663)
-0.063r
(0.0381)
0.00238

Speaker

................................................ (0.00356) ..................... (0.00447) ................ (0.00366).. ...... .
0.0616
-1.064***
-0.117

Committee chair

(0.241)
1.346***

(0.224)
0.525***

(0.137)
0.0174

Subcommittee chair

(0.0809)
0.710***

(0.0682)
0.290***

(0.0507)
0.00606

(0.0345)
-0.0849**

(0.0287)
-0.0658**

(0.0422)
0.0310
(0.0372)
-0.0251

(0.0273)
-0.0301

Majority leader

(0.0401)
0.0104
(0.0273)
0.00750
(0.0327)
0.349***

Minority leader

(0.0955)
-0.0390

In majority party

(0.0384)
0.310***

(0.0860)
-0.0971
(0.0729)
0.190***

(0.0885)
0.0744
(0.0638)
0.0434*

Power committee
Budget committee

(0.0347)
-0.0264

....................................... ................................................... (0.0240) ..................... (0.0306) .................. J0.0257) ...........
State unemployment rate
-0.00501
-0.00175
-0.00247
...................................................................................................... (0.00887>.., .................... (0.00960).......................(0.00863) .......... .
0.342***
3.010***
1.160***
Constant
(0.136)
(0.121)
(0.105)
No
Legislator fixed effects
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
State fixed effects
8,289
8,289
8,289
Observations
0.440
0.603
0.102
AdjustedR2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
••• p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.l
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Table 4: Seniority Effects
VARIABLES
OW-Nominate Score

Logged Legislative Effectiveness Score
(10)
(11)
-0.125***
-0.129***

Party Pres. Vote Share

(0.0453)
-0.144*

(0.0455)
-0.133**

(0.0786)
1.firstterm

(0.0621)
-0.0734

0b.firstterm#co.partypres

(0.0500)
0

l.firstterm#c.partypres

0.00378

(O)

Democrat

-0.155***

(0.0868)
-0.158***

Female

(0.0371)
-0.00451

(0.0372)
-0.00453

Seniority

(0.0186)
0.0202**

(0.0186)
0.0192***

Speaker

.............................. (0.00790) ................................................... (0.00206) ....................... .
-0.211 **
-0.208**

Committee chair

(0.0958)
0.759***

(0.0965)
0.763***

Subcommittee chair

(0.0457)
0.341***

(0.0455)
0.331 ***

Power committee

(0.0191)
-0.0560***

(0.0190)
-0.0638***

Budget committee

(0.0149)
-0.0136

(0.0151)
-0.0173

Majority leader

(0.0158)
0.148***

(0.0158)
0.139***

Minority leader

(0.0452)
-0.0565**

(0.0453)
-0.0607**

In majority party

(0.0242)
0.228***

(0.0240)
0.234***

······ ................................................................................. ............ J0.0137) ..................................................... (0.0135) ...................... ..
State unemployment rate
-0.00164
-0.00151
c.partypres#c.seniority

(0.00440)
0.00277

Constant

(0.0128)
0.321***

Observations
Adjusted R2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
••• p<0.01, •• p<0.05, * p<0.1

(0.0643)
8,289
0.478
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0.342***
(0.0577)
8,289

0.480
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whether lawmakers respond to competition by increasing productivity in equal measure throughout their tenure in office. Our data indicate that they do. Table 4 displays
the results of two additional models, both of which used the specifications of Model 6
with slight alterations. Model 10 interacts the independent variables of party presidential vote share with legislator seniority, and Model 11 interacts party presidential
vote share with a dummy variable indicating whether or not the legislator is a freshman. Neither model found statistically significant effects for the interaction terms,
indicating that legislator responses to electoral competition are relatively consistent,
no matter how long they have been in office. Figure 5 provides visual confirmationthe drop persists regardless of seniority.

Figure 5: Lowess Plots by Seniority
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Limitations
Some empirical and theoretical limitations of our findings deserve mentioning.
First, it is difficult to discern whether the increased productivity observed for legislators in competitive districts is solely a function of them choosing to work harder
or whether party leaders are simply favoring the agenda of threatened members in
order to prevent them from losing their seats. We think it is likely that both the extra
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individual effort and the extra help from party leaders occurs. To our knowledge
there is no data that could help us ascertain exactly how much of each occurs. Perhaps
more qualitative research, such as legislator interviews, would provide some sort of
assessment along those lines. For the purposes of our work here, however, the most
important point is that productivity clearly varies by electoral competitiveness; we
leave the identification of internal mechanisms to future studies.
Second, it is important to note that our measure of district competitiveness does
not account for the threat of primary election challengers. This would have been true
even if we had used own-election vote share instead of presidential-election data.
Consequently, we cannot control for the electoral pressure that some legislators might
feel from possible primary challengers even when their district decidedly favors their
party. The data would likely be difficult to obtain, but it seems possible that future
research could replicate our methods with primary-election results in addition to
general-election information, which would strengthen the generalizability of the conclusions. However, we do not believe it likely that doing so would find dramatically
different results from what we have observed here.

Conclusion
Given the relative scarcity of research connecting electoral competitiveness
and legislative productivity, our study has begun to fill an important gap in the
scholarly literature. We have leveraged a new, rich combination of data to test theories of legislators' behavioral responses to electoral vulnerability, finding effects
on productivity that are remarkable both in their refutation of previous findings
and in the magnitude of their implications. These findings are critical to our understanding of legislative outcomes.
The good news of our results is that legislators respond to electoral incentives to
perform the duties of the offices to which they were elected. This indicates that elections
are at least somewhat successful at holding them accountable to voters and donors for
their productivity (or, at the very least, legislators believe that voters and donors will
react to their productivity-either way, the outcome is the same).
The bad news is that uncompetitive elections have the same power to affect productivity. As soon as legislators feel they are safe from challengers, their productivity
drops off sharply-most dramatically in their production of substantive and significant
legislation. Given the general decline in electoral competitiveness over the last several
decades (Streb 2015), this finding has disturbing implications for the overall effectiveness of the House of Representatives as a legislative body. Indeed, Congress' productivity in recent sessions has been the lowest in modern history (Ornstein et al. 2014).
Perhaps, then, it is not so difficult to explain the disparate priorities of Senator
Lee and Representative Love in both their debate rhetoric and legislative behavior.
One of them simply faced much less electoral competition than the other and was
consequently much less motivated to focus on legislative productivity. This individual comparison has implications for Congressional productivity in the aggregate. Our
135

SIGMA

results suggest that one method to encourage the accountability necessary to incentivize productivity would be to increase the competitiveness of elections. In other
words, our democracy would likely benefit from healthier competition.
NOTES
1. From Volden and Wiseman 2009: "A bill is deemed substantive and significant if it had been
the subject of an end-of-the-year write-up in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. A bill
was deemed commemorative if it satisfied any one of several criteria, such as providing for
a renaming, commemoration, private relief of an individual, and the like. Finally, all other
bills, and any erstwhile "commemorative" bills that were also the subject of a CQ Almanac
write-up were classified as substantive."
2. In our regression models, we log-transform the LES scores, which helps the data to better
fit the assumption of normal distribution needed for regression analysis. Additionally, all
models are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. However, we do not use any
transformations in the charts in order to better display substantive effects. In any case, the
differences between the two models are small.
3. See note 2 for qualifications of substantive and significant legislation.
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